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IN THE SUPRElllE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
M. S. COSTELLO, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN I. KASTELER, and URANIUM 
CHEJ\IIICAL CORPORATION, 
a Corporation, 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 8759 
(Respondent will be referred to as plaintiff and 
appellants will be referred to as defendants herein.) 
Plaintiff agrees, generally, with the statement of 
facts set forth by defendants in their brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING RESPOND-
ENT TO AMEND HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST 
THE APPELLANTS, WITH INTEREST, ON THE BASIS OF 
THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE SERVICES REN-
DERED. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING JUDG-
MENT AGAINST THE APPELLANTS JOHN I. KASTELER 
AND URANIUM CHEMICAL CORPORATION, JOINTLY AND 
SEVERALLY, OR, IF THE ·COURT ERRED, THE ERROR 
SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY THIS COURT OR BY RE-
MAND TO THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT A RETRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING RESPOND-
ENT TO AMEND HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
Both the original complaint and the amended com-
plaint, prior to the amendment complained of, contained 
an allegation that the reasonable value of said services 
is the sum of $1,155.00 (Tr. 1, 8, 9). 
The trial court permitted plaintiff to amend his 
amended complaint at trial prior to the presentation of 
any evidence, over defendant's objection. Defendants, in 
the third paragraph of their brief, p.age 7, concede that: 
"* * * the court permitted the plaintiff to 
amend his amended complaint by interlineation to 
insert the following words both in the cmnplaint 
and in the prayer (emphasis ours) of the com-
plaint, to ·wit: 'or the reasonable Yalue of said 
services.' " 
In pern1itting the a1nendment over defendants' ob-
jection, the trial court took the position that the inclusion 
of the allegation of reasonable value in both the original 
complaint and the amended con1plaint, prior to the amend-
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3 
ment complained of, constituted adequate notice to de-
fendants that plaintiff would proceed on the theory of 
an express contract or upon the doctrine of quantum 
meruit, and that defendants had an opportunity to meet 
the issues presented. 
In support of the trial court's position, we cite the 
following: 
Christensen v. Johnson, 61 P. 2nd. 697, Utah. 
The essential facts of the Christensen vs. Johnson 
case as they relate to this case are .as follows : Plaintiff 
filed a complaint for services rendered in which it was 
alleged, in part, as follows: 
"'Between the 9th day of April, 1952, and the 
14th day of March, 1953, plaintiffs performed pro-
fessional services for said defendant at his special 
instance and request, which said services consisted 
of * * * ; that said services were of the fair and 
reasonable value of $300.00, which sum defendant 
agreed to pay for said services upon completion 
thereof.''' 
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiffs 
and defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed 
judgment for plaintiffs and on page 600, in part, said: 
"As we understand appellant, he claims that 
there is a material variance between the allega-
tions of the complaint and the evidence given in 
support thereof in that (1) the complaint is found-
ed upon an express contract while plaintiff's evi-
dence at most merely tends to support a cause 
of action based upon the doctrine of quantum 
meruit and (2) * * *. Neither of such contentions 
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[referring to (1) and (2)] can be successfully 
maintained. It will be observed that it is alleged 
in the complaint that the services were rendered 
at the special instance and request of the defend-
ant and that the fair and reasonable value thereof 
is $300.00. Such allegations state a cause of action 
without the allegation that defendant promised to 
pay for the services. * * *" 
Rule 15 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 1953, 
provides, in part : 
"* * * otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires." 
Rule 15 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Proced1.tre, 1953. 
provides, in part : 
"* * * if evidence is objected to at the trial 
on the ground that it is not within the issues made 
by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings 
to be amended when the presentation of the merits 
of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense upon the 1nerits. 
The court shall gr.ant a continuance, if necessary, 
to enable the objecting party to n1eet such evi-
dence." 
The trial court decided that justice required that the 
mnend1nent be allo·wed. Defendants failed to convince 
the court that the amendn1ent and the ad1nission of evi-
dence pursuant to the mnend1nent ·would prejudice de-
fendants or that grounds for .a continuance existed. 
In view of the Christensen v. Jolin sou case, it appears 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
that it would have been proper for the court to admit 
evidence at the trial of this case on the theory of quantum 
meruit under the amended complaint without the amend-
ment which was allowed. If this is so, defend~nts could 
not complain of the amendment nor could they clain1 
surprise. In any event, it appears that after leave to 
amend was granted, the trial court could decide the case 
on the theory of quantum meruit. It is noted that Mr. 
Kasteler gave evidence as to the reasonable value of 
the services rendered, but the trial court chose to believe 
the evidence of plaintiff (Tr. 51). 
The citation on page 8 of defendants' brief shown 
as "71 C.J.S. at Page 496, Par. 281 ;" is out of context. 
The full par.agra.ph in which the quotation appears is 
as follows: 
71 C.J.S.J Section 281) pp. 596-597. 
* * * 
"Surprise. If an amendment, in other respects 
proper, does not surprise the adverse party, it 
may be properly allowed, and leave to amend will 
be liberally granted where the proposed amend-
ment will not so change the case .as to cause sur-
prise to the other party. On the other hand, no 
party should be called into court prepared to try 
one issue and then be required to try another, 
of which he then for the first time has notice, 
and the discretion of the court should be exercised 
so as to prevent surprise. Whether or not an 
amendment will cause surprise depends largely 
on circumstances. 
"* * * " 
The citation on page 8 of defendants' brief shown 
as "71 C.J.S. at Page 602, Par. 282 ;"is out of context. ThE' 
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full paragraph 1n which the quotation appears 1s as 
follows: 
71 C.J.S., Section282, pp. 601-602. 
"* * * 
"In general, pleadings may be .amended at or 
during the trial, the allowance or refusal of 
amendments at such time being largely within the 
discretion of the trial court and dependent on 
the character of the proposed amendment. It is 
error for the court arbitrarily to refuse a trial 
amendment where such amendment is required in 
the interest of justice. On the other hand, under 
the general rule that an amendment will be refused 
where it would be prejudicial to the rights of the 
adverse party, as discussed Section 281 b, ~n 
amendment at the trial will not be allowed where 
it would so result. The opposite party will be 
granted an opportunity to make a showing for a 
continuance, if surprised by an amendment allowed 
at the trial. 
"* * * " 
Regarding the citation on page 8 of defendants' 
brief, 100 P. 848, Bowers, et uJ~. v. Good, et ux., Washing-
ton, the complaint in this case alleged an express con-
tract, breach and sought damages. Respondents answered 
with a general denial. On the day of trial respondents 
filed over appellant's objection an amended answer in 
which the respondents denied the contract as alleged 
by appellants and set up an .affirmative defense of an 
oral contract of sale, failure of respondents to perform, 
settlernent and a release. The appellants contended that 
the court committed error in pennitting an amended 
answer to be filed on the day of trial, that a new issue 
had been raised and that appellants were not prepared. 
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The court held that the objection was not well taken 
and the amendment was upheld. It appears that this 
citation is dicta. 
Regarding the citation on page 9 of defendants' 
brief, Safeway Cab Service Company of Oklahoma City 
v. Gadbury, 27 P. 2nd 434 Oklahoma, this was a personal 
injury c.ase wherein the trial court permitted an amend-
ment of the petition which alleged a back injury to allege 
that the accident augmented a prior osteoarthritic con-
dition. The appellate court held that this did not consti-
tute error. It appears that this citation is dicta. 
In view of the foregoing, we submit that the trial 
court committed no error in allowing the amendment. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST 
THE APPELLANTS, WITH INTEREST, ON THE BASIS OF 
THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE SERVICES REN-
DERED. 
If defendants in Point II of their brief, are arguing 
that there was no express contract, plaintiff admits that 
the trial court expressly decided that the contract in-
volved was a contract implied in law for the reasonable 
value of the services rendered. 
If defendants are contending that the decision and 
findings of the trial court on the basis of an implied 
contract are not supported by the evidence, plaintiff 
contends that the evidence adequately supports the de-
cision and findings. We cite the following: Plaintiff 
testified that defendant Kasteler requested plaintiff to 
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perform services and did not identify himself as the 
agent of the Uranium Chemical Corporation ( Tr. 18, 19, 
20). Plaintiff testified he performed the services (Tr. 
26), and it was stipulated that 770 tons of e.arth were 
hauled by plaintiff (Tr. 28). Plaintiff testified as to the 
reasonable value of the services performed (Tr. 29, 30). 
Defendants also gave testimony as to the reasonable 
v;alue of said services ( Tr. 51). 
The trial court found defendant John I. Kasteler 
contacted plaintiff and requested plaintiff to perform 
services, found that John I. Kasteler did not identify 
himself as the agent of the U rani urn Chemical Corpora-
tion, found that $1.50 per ton was the reasonable value 
of said services, and found that U rani urn Chemical Cor-
poration received the benefit of said services (Tr. 70, 
71). 
The other matters argued by defendants which relate 
to the propriety of the amendment and the opportunity 
of defendants to produce witnesses .are dealt with in 
Point I of this brief. 
Defendants further state that the trial court chose 
to disregard certain testimony. \Yeighing the evidence 
and judging the credibility of the witnesses is the proper 
function of the trier of fact, and the decision of the trial 
court as to these matters is entitled to considerable 
weight on .appeal. 
It is submitted that the trial court did not err in 
rendering judg1nent .against both defendants with inter-
est, on the basis of reasonable value of said selTires for 
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any of the reasons cited by defendants in Point II of 
their brief. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING JUDG-
MENT AGAINST THE APPELLANTS JOHN I. KASTELER 
AND URANIUM CHEMICAL CORPORATION, JOINTLY AND 
SEVERALLY, OR, IF THE COURT ERRED, THE ERROR 
SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY THIS COURT OR BY RE-
MAND TO THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT A RETRIAL. 
Although there are different rules, the majority 
opinion in the United States seems to be that after dis-
covery of the undisclosed principal for whom the agent 
was .acting, judgment cannot ordinarily be had against 
both the principal and agent. However, the cases are in 
conflict under the "Pennsylvania view,'' and the Cali-
fornia cases apply a well-considered modification or 
exception to the general rule. It is clear that both the 
agent and the undisclosed principal may be sued in the 
same action under any of the theories mentioned. 
Defendants contend that it is the obligation of plain-
tiff to elect whether he will take judgment against the 
agent or the undisclosed princip.al. The California cases 
require the agent or the undisclosed principal to require 
an election or the right is waived and judgment may be 
granted against both. 
At page 14 of their brief, defendants cite the case 
of Love, et al. v. St. Joseph Stockyards Company, 169 
Pacific 951, Utah. The facts of this case show that the 
agent was given a written release and thereafter an 
action was instituted against the undisclosed principal. 
The trial court dismissed the action, the plaintiff appe.aled 
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and this court affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this case 
does not decide the point in issue. Plaintiff has not 
located a Utah case which directly resolves the issue. 
On page 15 of defendants' brief, defendants cite 
from the case of Ewing v. Hayward, et al., 195 Pacific 
970, California, ( 1920). This is an action against Hayward 
and others .as co-partners. The trial court gave judgment 
against all defendants jointly and defendant, the New-
mark Grain Company, appealed. On page 97 4, the court 
states, in part: 
"The evidence being insufficient to support 
the finding of agency, the judgment c.annot stand. 
It is therefore needless to discuss any other point 
urged. The judgment is reversed as to the defend-
ant, Newmark Grain Company." 
The quotation from the above case cited by defend-
ants on page 15 of their brief is from a concurring opinion 
written by P. J. Finlayson, is dicta and does not set 
forth the California law on the point in issue. 
The annotation in 118 A.L.R. at page 707 reads, in 
part, as follows: 
"b. Waiver of right to compel election. It 
has been held that the rule that the plaintiff before 
the close of the case must elect whether he will 
take judgment against the one or the other is 
subject to an exception, or Inodification, which 
holds that the right to compel an election is waived 
by failure to dmnand or n1ove for that re1nedy 
during the course of the trial. Ora ig v. Buckley 
(1933) 218 Cal. 78, 21 P. (2nd) 430. (Citing other 
c.ases) * * * ." 
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In a 1951 case upholding a judgment against both 
undisclosed principal and agent, the California court, in 
JicEwen v. Taylor, 234 P. (2nd) at page 757, said in part: 
"Concerning appellant's contention that in 
taking judgment against Doudouris, respondent 
elected to hold him and release appellant, it ap-
pears in the foregoing quotation from Klinger v. 
Modesto Fruit Company, that our courts have held 
that in such an action as this, election is not re-
quired until and unless the party entitled to the 
benefit of an election seeks by motion or other-
wise to compel the election to be made and if no 
such action be taken by him, then he has waived 
the right to compel such an election, and judgment 
against both the agent and undisclosed principal 
may be upheld. (Citing cases) * * * ." 
At page 759, the same court said, in part: 
"* * *the right to an election operates in favor 
of the principal and agent, and it is their duty to 
seasonably make the demand. Such duty does not 
rest upon the plaintiff or third party creditor. 
(Citing cases) * * * ." 
In the case of Joseph Melnick Bu·ilding and Loan 
~1ssociation, et al. v. Link Building and Loan Associa-
tion, et al., 64 A. (2d) 773, Pennsylvania, (1949), the 
Pennsylvania court said at page 776, in part: 
"This court has decided that the third party 
has the option to proceed against either the agent 
or his principal, or both, but is entitled to one 
satisfaction. (emphasis theirs). This principle was 
established in the leading case of Beymer v. Bon-
sall, 79 Pa. 298, which has been consistently fol-
lowed. (Citing cases) * * * ." 
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The same court further states at page 777, in part: 
"If under the Pennsylvania rule, the third 
person may proceed against either the agent or 
the undisclosed principal or both, the liability is 
joint and several. (emphasis theirs) (Citing cases) 
***" 
The Pennsylvania view permits pursuit of both agent 
and principal until the claim is satisfied and follows 
the analogy of the prevailing American law allowing a 
creditor beneficiary a similar double right. Under the 
Pennsylvania rule no exception is necessary to justify 
what are exceptions under the other view, pern1i tting 
judgment against both the agent and principal if the 
objection has been waived because not made in time. 
Under the evidence and the findings here, whether 
the Utah law is controlled by the general rule or the 
modifications or exceptions to it, plaintiff would have 
been entitled to judgment against defendant John I. 
Kasteler as the agent of an undisclosed principal or 
against Uranium Chemical Corporation, the undisclosed 
principal, if an election had been made, whether the 
duty to require an election is upon plaintiff or defendants. 
The issues have been fully tried and it would be a useless 
act to require a new trial on these issues if the decision 
and findings of the trial court are supported by the 
evidence, which we submit they are. 
Should the Supren1e Court of the State of Utah 
decide so to do, they have the power to strike the judg-
ment against one of the defendants or remand the case 
to the trial court with directions to strike one of the 
defendants upon the election of plaintiff. If the eourt 
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should decide that judgment against one of the defendants 
should be stricken, the plaintiff is willing to elect, and 
hereby does elect, to hold defendant John I. l{asteler 
liable as the agent of an undisclosed principal and stipu-
lates that the judgment against defendant U rani urn 
Chemical Corporation may be stricken. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GREENWOOD and SwAN and 
E. EARL GREENWOOD, JR. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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